The principle of insufficient reason, or indifference principle, is not an axiom of probability but the basis for the definition of classical (logical) probability. Bayesian statisticians also follow the principle of using uniform distributions when there is no a priori information about the parameter. Is this principle acceptable to statistical philosophers?. Several paradoxes have been proposed to refute this principle. Although these paradoxes have not been resolved, the principle is still the basis of the most important definition of probability, classical probability. In this article, this principle, its origin, and paradoxes are evaluated.
Chinipardaz, R. & Mansouri, B. (2025). The Principle of Insufficient Reason and its Challenges. Andishe_ye Amari, 29(2), 54-60. https://doi.org/10.22034/aa.2026.734247
MLA
Chinipardaz, R., & Mansouri, B. "The Principle of Insufficient Reason and its Challenges", Andishe_ye Amari, 29, 2, 2025, 54-60. doi: 10.22034/aa.2026.734247
HARVARD
Chinipardaz R., Mansouri B. (2025). 'The Principle of Insufficient Reason and its Challenges', Andishe_ye Amari, 29(2), pp. 54-60. doi: 10.22034/aa.2026.734247
CHICAGO
R. Chinipardaz & B. Mansouri, "The Principle of Insufficient Reason and its Challenges," Andishe_ye Amari, 29 2 (2025): 54-60, doi: 10.22034/aa.2026.734247
VANCOUVER
Chinipardaz R., Mansouri B. The Principle of Insufficient Reason and its Challenges. Andishe_ye Amari. 2025;29(2):54-60 (In Persian). doi: 10.22034/aa.2026.734247
